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Abstract 
At the current time, when India is endeavoring to sustain its high growth rate, it is 
imperative that financing constraints in any form be removed and alternative financing 
channels be developed in a systematic manner for supplementing traditional bank credit. 
While the equity market in India has been quite active, the size of the corporate debt 
market is very small in comparison with not only developed markets, but also some of the 
emerging market economies in Asia such as Malaysia, Thailand and China. A liquid 
corporate bond market can play a critical role by supplementing the banking system to 
meet the requirements of the corporate sector for long-term capital investment and asset 
creation. While it is true that the Indian corporate debt market has transformed itself into 
a much more vibrant trading field for debt instruments from the elementary market about 
a decade ago, yet there is still along way to go. In this brief note, we systematically study 
the issues and challenges facing the corporate debt market in India, throw light upon the 
steps already taken by regulatory authorities to give fillip to this debt market and also 
provide our own recommendations.  
 
JEL Classification: G1, G2 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the current time, when India is endeavoring to enhance its growth rate, it is 
imperative that financing constraints in any form be removed and alternative financing 
channels be developed in a systematic manner for supplementing traditional bank credit. 
In this context, development of long-term debt markets – corporate debt as well as 
municipal debt – is critical in mobilization of the huge magnitude of funding required to 
finance potential business expansion and infrastructure development.  
Before we discuss the evolution and current state of Indian corporate debt market, it 
may be useful to discuss the rationale for long-term debt markets, in general as well as in 
context of the Indian economy and to analyze the significant role played by long-term 
debt markets in supporting economic development, especially in emerging market 
economies (henceforth EMEs). 
a) Ensuring financial system stability: A liquid corporate bond market can play a 
critical role by supplementing the banking system to meet the requirements of the 
corporate sector for long-term capital investment and asset creation. Banking systems 
cannot be the sole source of long-term investment capital without making an economy 
vulnerable to external shocks. Historical and cross-sectional experience has shown that 
systemic problems in the banking sector can interrupt flow of funds from savers to 
investors for a dangerously long period of time (Jiang, Tang, & Law, 2002). One of the 
lessons from the 1997 Asian financial crisis was the importance of having non-bank 
funding channels open. In the aftermath of this crisis, a number of countries in the region 
that were badly affected by the financial turmoil, including Korea, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Hong Kong, have made progress in building their own corporate debt markets. 
Spreading credit risk from banks’ balance sheets more broadly through the financial 
system lowers the risks to financial stability. Bond financing reduces macroeconomic 
vulnerability to shocks and systemic risk through diversification of credit and investment 
risks. 
b) Enabling meaningful coverage of real sector needs: The financial sector in India is 
too small to cater to the needs of the real economy. A comparison of the asset size of the 
top ten corporations and that of the top ten banks (as shown in Figure	  1 below) reveals that 
banks in India are unable to meet the scale or sophistication of the financial needs of 
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corporate India. Needless to say, the financial system is not big enough to meet the needs 
of small and medium-sized enterprises either. While these are pointers to the fact that the 
banking sector in India needs to be larger than its current size, they are also clear 
indicators that debt markets need to grow manifold to ensure that the financial sector 
becomes adequate for an economy as large and ambitious as India’s.  
  
Figure	  1:	  A	  comparison	  of	  the	  asset	  size	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  corporates	  and	  exposure	  limits	  of	  the	  top	  ten	  banks	  above	  
reveals	  the	  disparity	  in	  credit	  demand	  and	  supply.	  Panel	  A:	  Assets	  of	  top	  10	  corporations	  (2011)	  	  	  Panel	  B:	  Capital	  
funds	  and	  exposure	  limits	  of	  top	  10	  banks	  (2011)	  
c) Creating new classes of investors: Commercial banks face asset-liability mismatch 
issues in providing longer-maturity credit. Development of a corporate debt market  
enables participation from institutions that have the capacity as well as aptitude for longer 
maturity exposures. Financial institutions like insurance companies and provident funds 
have long-term liabilities and do not have access to adequate high quality long-term 
assets to match them. Creation of a deep corporate bond market can enable them to invest 
in long-term corporate debt, thus serving the twin goals of diversifying corporate risk 
across the financial sector and enabling these institutions to access high quality long-term 
assets. Thus, access to long-term debt opens up the market to new classes of investors 
with an appetite for longer maturity assets and thereby helps prevent maturity 
mismatches. 
d) Reduced currency mismatches: The development of local currency bond markets 
has been seen as a way to avoid crisis, not only by supplementing bank credit but also 
because these markets help reduce potential currency mismatches in the financial system. 
Currency mismatches can be avoided by issuing local currency bonds. Thus, well-
developed, liquid bond markets can help firms reduce their overall cost of capital by 
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allowing them to tailor their asset and liability profiles to reduce the risk of both maturity 
and currency mismatches. 
e) Term structure and effective transmission of monetary policy: The creation of 
long-term debt markets also enables the generation of market interest rates at the long end 
of the yield curve, thereby facilitating the development of a more complete term structure 
of interest rates. A deeper, more responsive interest rate market would in turn provide the 
central bank with a mechanism for effective transmission of monetary policy. 
 
CURRENT STATUS OF INDIAN CORPORATE DEBT MARKET 
India has been distinctly lagging behind other EMEs in developing its long-term 
corporate debt market. While the equity market in India has been quite active, size of the 
corporate debt market is very small compared to not only developed markets, but also 
major EMEs in Asia such as Malaysia, Thailand and China. Traditionally, bank finance 
coupled with equity markets and external borrowings has been the preferred funding 
source in India. Small and medium enterprises face significant challenges in raising funds 
for growth. 
The proportion of bank loans to GDP in India is approximately 37% (Reinhart, C. 
M. & Rogoff, K. S.), while that of corporate debt to GDP is only 5.4% (BIS, 2012). The 
BIS report estimates the corporate debt securities in India to be nearly INR 4.5 trillion in 
2011. However, according to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (henceforth 
SEBI) database, outstanding corporate bonds amount to around INR 9 trillion during the 
same period making it nearly 10.5% of GDP (SEBI, 2012). In contrast, corporate bond 
outstanding is close to 90% of GDP in USA where the corporate bond market is most 
developed and bond market financing has long replaced bank financing; around 34% in 
Japan, and close to 60% in South Korea (BIS, 2012). In terms of size, as of 2011, the 
Indian corporate bond market is close to 7% of that of China and 15% of that of South 
Korea (BIS, 2012). For a sample of eight Indian corporations that featured in Forbes 
2000, corporate bonds accounted for only 21% of total long term financing. In contrast, 
corporate bonds accounted for nearly 80% of total long term debt financing by 
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corporations in the four developed economies of USA, Germany, Japan and South 
Korea.2  
In India the long-term debt market consists largely of government securities 
(henceforth G-Secs). In 2011, in terms of size, Indian corporate bond market stood at 
INR 8,895 billion which was only 31% of G-Secs, the outstanding issuances of which 
stood at a staggering INR 28,427 billion (SEBI, 2012). Based on the experience of G7 
countries since the 1970s, Goldman Sachs has estimated that the total capitalization of the 
Indian debt market (including public-sector debt) could grow nearly four-fold over the 
next decade from roughly USD 400 billion in 2006 to USD 1.5 trillion by 2016 (Goldman 
Sachs, 2007). This growth, if not crowded out by public sector debt, could result in 
increased access to debt markets for Indian corporates.   
 
	  
Figure	  2:	  Funding	  split	  of	  long	  term	  debt	  raised	  by	  corporations 
The total corporate bond issuance in India is highly fragmented because bulk of 
the debt raised is through private placements. The dominance of private placements has 
been attributed to several factors, including ease of issuance, cost efficiency and 
primarily institutional demand (Patil, 2005). Furthermore, trading is concentrated in a few 
securities, with the top five to ten traded issues accounting for bulk of the total turnover 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Based on data collected for a sample of 72 corporations across 9 countries, including India, for FY 2010-
11.	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(SEBI, 2010). The secondary market is also minuscule, accounting for only a small share 
of the total trading Figure	  3.  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Turnover	  in	  Indian	  financial	  market	  (Source:	  RBI	  Database	  on	  Indian	  Economy,	  www.indiastat.com,	  SEBI) 
Development of the domestic corporate debt market in India is constrained by a 
number of factors; the prominent ones being-low issuance leading to illiquidity in the 
secondary market, narrow investor base, high costs of issuance, and lack of transparency 
in trades. The market suffers from deficiencies in products, participants and institutional 
framework.  
All these despite the fact that India is fairly well placed insofar as pre-requisites 
for the development of the corporate debt market are concerned. There is a reasonably 
well-developed government securities market, which generally precedes the development 
of the market for corporate debt securities. The major stock exchanges in India have 
trading platforms for transactions in debt securities. Infrastructure also exists for clearing 
and settlement in the form of the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL). Finally, 
the presence of multiple rating agencies meets the requirement of an assessment 
framework for bond quality.  
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SUPPLY SIDE ISSUES 
The peculiar issue with the Indian corporate debt market is not that it faces challenges 
due to a lack of adequate infrastructure as mentioned above. Some of the constraints are 
structural while some emanate from regulatory roadblocks. In what follows, we have 
systematically categorized these issues into supply-side, demand-side, secondary-market 
and risk-hedging related issues and have made an attempt in this chapter to explore each 
of these issues in detail.  
Analysis of the Private Placement Market 
As mentioned earlier, the total corporate bond issuance in India is highly fragmented 
because bulk of debt raised is through private placements. In fact over 95% of the 
issuances in India are through private placements. The private placement route requires 
that the issuer make an offer to a select group of investors, no more than 50, to invest in 
the debt securities for issue. However, corporations are known to circumvent the 49 
investor cap in private issuances by making multiple bond issuances for many groups of 
49 investors or satisfying the greater demand through immediate secondary market 
transfers upon the completion of the primary issue, thus diffusing the issue among a 
greater number of subscribers. Therefore there is a clear need to remove impediments that 
hinder the development of the institutional side of the market. 
The SEBI Issue and Listing of Debt Securities Regulations 2008, in Ch III, Sec 20 
lays out conditions for private placement that include, compliance with The Companies 
Act of 1956, obtaining credit rating, listing of securities, mandating disclosure standards 
as per Sec 21 that stipulates the documentation and disclosure requirements (detailed in 
Schedule I of the Regulations3). The private placement disclosure and documentation 
requirements are viewed by the market to be comprehensive yet not being too onerous in 
terms of compliance. On the other hand, disclosure and documentation requirements for 
public placement of securities are viewed by the market as being extremely onerous and 
difficult to comply with.  
In addition to the Schedule I requirements for private placements, public 
placements also have to comply with additional disclosure requirements, as specified in 
Schedule II of The Companies Act of 1956. These are an exhaustive set of disclosures in 
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three parts. The first part contains general information, capital structure information, 
terms and issue particulars, information on company, management and project as well as 
information on all companies under the same management, and finally management 
perception of risk factors. The second part contains additional general, financial, statutory 
and other informational disclosures. With such an extensive set of disclosure 
requirements for public issues, it seems that the market has been avoiding this route for 
issuing bonds. This is evident from Figure	   4 that private placement route outscores the 
public offer route for resource mobilization among the Indian corporates.  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Corporate	  debt	  raised	  through	  public	  offers	  and	  private	  placements	  (*2012	  data	  is	  as	  of	  Dec	  2012)	  (SEBI	  
Handbook,	  2012) 
 Table 1: Resource mobilization in private placement market (RBI Handbook, 2012) 
 Private Sector 
 Financial Institutions Non-Financial Institutions Total 
Year No. of Issues Amount No. of Issues Amount No. of Issues Amount 
2008-09             687              606              383              351          1,070              957  
2009-10         1,630          1,424              640              909          2,270           2,333  
2010-11             878              720              460              495          1,338           1,215  
 Private Sector 
 Financial Institutions Non-Financial Institutions Total 
Year No. of Issues Amount No. of Issues Amount No. of Issues Amount 
2008-09             123              656                91              428              214           1,084  
2009-10             151              743                67              357              218           1,100  
2010-11             212              990                38              180              250           1,169  
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Table 1 above reiterates that over the years, number of issuances by the private 
sector has been much more than that of the public sector. However, volumes of the 
private sector have been lower than public sector. This indicates that the average size of 
issue by private sector corporations has been close to INR 1 billion as against the larger 
size of public sector issuances amounting to INR 4 to 5.5 billion over the years.  
Table 1 also reveals that financial corporations dominate over their non-financial 
counterparts both in private and public sectors, in the number as well as volume of issues 
over the years. Figure	  5 also corroborates this finding.  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Break-­‐up	  of	  private	  issues	  and	  resource	  mobilization-­‐	  10	  year	  average	  over	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2010	  (RBI	  
Handbook,	  2012) 
Recent steps to address supply side issues 
In 2005, a High Powered Expert Committee (HPEC) on Corporate Bonds & 
Securitisation led by Dr. R.H. Patil—the Patil Committee, made a variety of 
recommendations to address prevailing issues in Indian corporate bond market. The 
recommendations were spread across three broad areas – (i) Primary Market, (ii) 
Secondary Market and (iii) Securitisation. One of the primary recommendations to 
address supply-side issues was enhancement of the issuer base. The Patil Committee 
recommended that in order to reduce the time and cost of public issuance, disclosure 
norms and listing requirements be reduced. The Committee also recommended that in the 
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case of issuers that are already listed, these requirements be reduced even further (Patil, 
2005). 
In 2007, SEBI was made the regulator for the primary and secondary bond 
markets. In December of the same year, SEBI vide circular dated December 3, 2007 
amended the provisions pertaining to issuances of Corporate Bonds under the SEBI 
(Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines, 2000. The changes to the guidelines 
were as below: 
•  For public issues of debt instruments, issuers now need to obtain rating from only 
one credit rating agency instead of from two. This was done with a view to reduce 
the cost of issuances. 
• In order to facilitate issuance of below-investment grade bonds to suit the risk 
appetite of investors, the stipulation that debt instruments issued publicly shall be 
of at least investment grade has been removed. 
• Further, in order to provide issuers with desired flexibility in structuring of debt 
instruments, structural restrictions such as those on maturity, put/call option, 
conversion, etc have been done away with. 
In May 2009, SEBI issued a Listing Agreement for Debt Securities that provided for a 
simplified regulatory framework for the issuance and listing of Non-Convertible 
Debentures (NCDs). The circular released by SEBI was split in two parts. The first part 
prescribed incremental disclosures for issuers that were already listed and the second part 
pertained to issuers who were unlisted and prescribed detailed disclosures for them. 
To conclude, supply-side issues in the Indian corporate debt market remain primarily 
cost related and to some extent related to heavy disclosure norms, some of which have 
recently been simplified through regulatory changes. Hopefully the steps taken by 
regulators to address these issues will help further deepen the bond market development 
by promoting more public issuances in multiple categories.  
 
DEMAND SIDE ISSUES 
Development of a smooth-functioning corporate debt market needs to be driven by 
demand-side reforms as well. A study of investment norms for banks, insurance 
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companies, pension funds, and provident funds helps to understand specifics of the 
investment bottlenecks that may have prevented the development of a well-functioning 
corporate debt market in India.  
According to the eligible Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) investments (as per Master 
Circular – Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) issued on July 
01, 2011), banks are required to hold 24% of their liabilities in cash, gold, central and 
state government investments, thereby leaving non-government bond market instruments 
completely out of the picture. 
For a life insurer it is very important to generate high returns while maintaining asset 
quality to avoid credit risk. In India, norms for insurance company investments are made 
in the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) Investment Amendment 
Regulations, 2001, and cover the following businesses: life insurance, pension and 
general annuities, unit linked life insurance, general insurance and re-insurance. The only 
section of the Act that allows for long-term, non-government investments is the 
infrastructure and social sector investments of 15+% and unapproved investments of 
15%. Further, according to this Act, the pensions and annuities businesses cannot have 
any portion of their funds invested in non-government linked investments. Investment 
regulations governing life businesses require that at least 65% of assets be held in various 
types of public sector bonds.  
Funds are permitted to invest in corporate bonds, but the category of “approved 
investments” only includes bonds rated AA or above. Bonds below AA (which are rare in 
India), can be held in unapproved assets. Then again, total unapproved assets cannot 
exceed 15% of the portfolio and are subject to exposure norms limiting exposure to any 
company or sector. In practice, insurance companies hold less than 7% in unapproved 
assets. For instance, as of 2011 and 2012 the proportion of unapproved assets in the total 
investments by life insurance companies were 4.85% and 4.42% respectively (IRDA, 
2012). 
A major part of investments (approx. 47%) for life and pension businesses is thus 
being held in G-Secs and other government approved securities, which are relatively safe 
instruments. In other words, the investment norms of insurance companies, banks, 
pension funds in India are heavily skewed towards investment in government and public 
	   12	  
sector bonds which acts as a detriment to the corporate bond market development. 
Without long-term investors like pension funds and insurance companies investing in 
corporate debt, it is difficult to see how the corporate debt market will take off. 
The adverse effect of this legal/regulatory lacuna on corporate debt market is further 
aggravated by the fact that the high fiscal deficit of the Government of India (GoI) is 
financed by the issue of GoI bonds or G-Secs. The fact that the Fiscal Responsibility and 
Budget Management (FRBM) Act that required the GoI to reduce its deficit to sub-3% 
levels by 2009 has been put in abeyance in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, 
implies that the fiscal deficit has been going up and government bond issuances continue 
to finance this deficit. This has effectively served to further crowd out private corporate 
debt issuance. 
The discussion above highlights the following key issues: 
1. High level of G-Sec issuances in the Indian debt market, 
2. Low level of corporate bond issues; both these issues are inter-related since large 
government debt issuance on account of high fiscal deficit has a crowding out 
effect on corporate debt, 
3. Market preference for very safe AA and above rated assets with little market for 
issuances below AA thus creating a very thin debt market. In fact till 2007-08, 
AA and above rated bonds accounted for nearly 70% of the total issues by number 
and nearly 92% by volume. Only in the last few years has the market seen a 
significant increase in the number of issuances of non-investment grade bonds. 
During 2010-11, bonds rated BBB and below accounted for nearly 75% of total 
issuances by number (Figure	  6) but only 12% by volume Figure	  7. AA and above 
rated bonds continue to dominate the market with nearly 80% of the share by 
volume in 2010-11.  
	   13	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Distribution	  of	  corporate	  bonds	  by	  rating	  (Issues)	  (SEBI	  Handbook,	  2012)	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  Distribution	  of	  corporate	  bonds	  by	  rating	  (Volumes)	  (SEBI	  Handbook,	  2012)	  
 
Recent steps to address demand side issues 
The Patil Committee made a few recommendations on enhancing the investor 
base – an important demand-side issue that was subsequently addressed in part by the 
SEBI. In order to enhance the investor base and diversify its profile, the Committee 
recommended that the investment guidelines of Provident/Pension Funds be directed by 
the risk profile of instruments rather than the nature of instruments. The Committee also 
recommended an increase in investment limits for Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs). 
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In the “Plan for a unified exchange traded corporate bond market” – a report of the 
internal committee of SEBI in 2006, it is mentioned that the point is to be taken up with 
the Government and Reserve Bank of India (RBI) wherever relevant – “So as to 
encourage the widest possible participation for domestic financial institutions, IRDA, the 
Central Board of Trustees of the Employee Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) and the 
Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) should modify their 
respective investment guidelines to permit insurance companies, provident and gratuity 
funds, and pension funds respectively to invest/ commit contributions to SEBI registered 
Infrastructure Debt Funds.” 
In July 2011, the EPFO put out requests for proposal while appointing custodians 
of Securities of EPFO. The document listed the investment guidelines for EPFO fund 
managers alongside terms and conditions and duties of custodians. Though the prescribed 
pattern of investment for EPFO favours investments in central and state government 
securities, it allows up to 30% to be invested in any central government securities, state 
government securities or securities of public financial institutions (public sector 
companies) at the discretion of the Trustees. Of this, one-third is permitted to be invested 
in private sector bonds/securities, which have an investment grade rating from at least 
two credit rating agencies, subject to the Trustees’ assessment of the risk-return 
prospects. 
Demand-side issues remain trickier to resolve as they are tied to a variety of other 
regulations on investment and an over-arching prescription for “safe investments” i.e. for 
instruments rated AA and above. Understandably, demand exists only for such 
instruments and the market caters to this demand, creating in turn a thin-market. A 
market for high-yield bonds is practically non-existent, suggesting that risk-return 
profiles are uniform throughout the market, which need not necessarily be the case.  
Moreover, much of this lack of appetite is also linked to the lackluster secondary 
market in corporate bonds. Investors in any market would require an active platform 
where they would be able to liquidate their assets or square off positions if need be, 
especially in a high-yield market. In the case of India’s fledgling secondary market in 
corporate bonds, market activity is highly bunched up at one end of the market at all 
times, making holding fixed-income securities riskier unless they are being held till 
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maturity. In keeping with the Patil Committee’s recommendations, investment guidelines 
that are directed by risk/return profile of investments and investor appetite rather than the 
nature of investments will help boost demand for a wider range of debt securities and 
hopefully help in building a deeper, more active market with varied investor profiles.  
 
SECONDARY MARKET ISSUES 
The absence of secondary markets for corporate bonds in India is arguably one of 
the most important reasons for this market not seeing the kind of growth one would 
expect. The public (G-Secs) debt market with an outstanding amount close to INR 27,468 
billion (USD 610.40 billion) (BIS, 2012), had a secondary market turnover of around Rs. 
29,689 billion (USD 660 billion) for the year 2011 (RBI, 2012). The outstanding amount 
of corporate debt was Rs. 8,895.1 billion (USD 197.7 billion) in 2011 (SEBI, 2012). The 
corporate debt turnover in the secondary market was roughly Rs. 6,041.9 billion (USD 
134.26 billion) during the year 2010-11. To put these numbers in context, by the end of 
2008, the Indian equity market turnover was roughly Rs. 46,808.8 billion (USD 1,040.2 
billion) (RBI, 2012). 
Besides the G-Secs market, there is a market for corporate debt papers in India 
which trades in short term instruments such as commercial papers and certificate of 
deposits issued by banks and also in long term instruments such as debentures, bonds, 
zero coupon bonds, step up bonds etc. Investors have stayed away from the fixed income 
secondary market as the market has lacked liquidity, transparency and depth. Some of the 
key issues that have traditionally plagued the secondary markets in long term debt in 
India are: i) absence of market makers and liquidity; ii) preference to bank deposits, 
postal savings schemes, NSCs etc over bonds because of liquidity risk; iii) lack of pricing 
and benchmarking-there is no yield curve at longer horizons due to thin trading volumes 
and poor price discovery. 
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Figure	  8:	  Corporate	  bond	  trading	  volumes	  (*2012-­‐13	  data	  is	  till	  Dec-­‐2012)	  (SEBI	  Handbook,	  2012) 
Although in principle, it is possible to determine a 30-year yield curve but 
insufficient liquidity makes it less credible; iv) small institutional investor base; v) lack of 
adequate risk management products; vi) higher interest rates; falling interest rates during 
2000s made G-Secs attractive and trading peaked during these periods. However, the 
reversal of the interest rate trend since 2004 has robbed the trading in G-Secs off its 
sheen. 
	  
Figure	  9:	  10-­‐year	  G-­‐Sec	  yield	  (Source:	  www.tradingeconomics.com)	  
This reluctance in investor participation warrants some amount of surprise as the 
necessary infrastructure for an active secondary market, i.e. trading, clearing and 
settlement seems to be in place. It is commonly accepted that even with sufficient market 
infrastructure, the corporate bond market continues to operate over-the-counter (OTC). 
This is the case even in bigger and more developed markets like the corporate debt 
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markets of the USA, where most trading occurs in an OTC dealer market. In the US, 
broker-dealers execute majority of the transactions in a principal capacity and act on 
behalf of their clients. In India however, SEBI has mandated that all OTC trades are to be 
reported, settled and cleared through the authorized clearing-houses. This paves the way 
for greater price discovery and an actual measure of activity in the OTC bond market. To 
explore the steps taken by SEBI to deepen secondary market activity, we feature a 
timeline in Box 1 that lists the developments in trading, reporting, clearing and settlement 
over the years. 
 
Box 1: Steps taken by SEBI to develop secondary market 
1. In 2005, the Patil Committee mandated the creation of a corporate bonds database by the 
major stock exchanges that would cover credit events in addition to other information 
about the bonds. Also, in order to address outstanding issues on the trading, reporting, 
clearing and settlement of corporate bonds, the committee also mandated that all trades 
be reported. 
 
2. In order to develop an exchange traded market for corporate bonds SEBI vide circulars 
dated December 12, 2006 and March 01, 2007 authorized the two stock exchanges – BSE 
and NSE, to set up and maintain corporate bond reporting platforms to capture all 
information related to trading in corporate bonds as accurately and as close to execution 
as possible. Subsequently, Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association 
(FIMMDA) has also been permitted to operate a reporting platform. As per the circulars, 
all issuers, intermediaries and contracting parties are granted access to the reporting 
platform for the purpose and transactions are to be reported within 30 minutes of closing 
the deal. The data reported on the platform is disseminated on the websites of BSE, NSE 
and FIMMDA. 
 
 
3. Trades executed by members of BSE/NSE are to be reported on the respective platforms 
of their stock exchanges. In the case of OTC trades parties can choose between any one 
of the three platforms. BSE and NSE shall coordinate amongst themselves to ensure that 
the information reported with them is aggregated, checked for redundancy and 
disseminated on their websites in a homogenous manner. The mandate applies to all 
trades in listed debt securities issued by banks, public sector undertakings, municipal 
corporations, bodies corporate and companies. Subsequent to the launch of the corporate 
bond-reporting platform at NSE, reporting may be made to either platforms of BSE or 
NSE but not to both for the same transaction. 
 
4. Further, in March 2007, NSE and BSE were advised by SEBI to provide data pertaining 
to corporate bonds comprising issuer name, maturity date, current coupon, last price 
traded, last amount traded, last yield (annualized) traded, weighted average yield price, 
total amount traded, rating of the bond and any other additional information as the stock 
exchanges think fit. In August 2007, SEBI started placing information on secondary 
market trades (both exchange and OTC trades) on its website on the basis of data 
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provided by the two exchanges.   
 
5. As a second phase of development, SEBI vide Circular dated April 13, 2007 permitted 
BSE and NSE to have in place corporate bond trading platforms to enable efficient price 
discovery and reliable clearing and settlement in a gradual manner. To begin with, BSE 
and NSE have launched an order driven trade-matching platform, which retains essential 
features of an OTC market where trades are executed through brokers. OTC trades 
however continue to be reported on the exchange reporting platforms. In order to 
encourage wider participation, the lot size for trading in bonds has been reduced to Rs.1 
lakh. On November 11, 2013 NSE launched its own trading platform.  
 
 
6. On October 16, 2009, SEBI mandated the clearing and settlement of corporate bond 
trades through clearing corporations. It was decided that all trades in corporate bonds 
between specified entities namely, MFs, FIIs, VCs, Foreign Venture Capital Investors, 
Portfolio Managers and RBI regulated entities shall necessarily be cleared and settled 
through the National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited (NSCCL) or the Indian 
Clearing Corporation Limited (ICCL). NSCCL issued a circular on November 23, 2009 
facilitating a centralized clearing and settlement mechanism for enabling smooth and 
robust transaction closures. The provisions of the circular apply to all corporate bonds 
traded OTC or on the debt segment of stock exchanges on or after Dec 01, 2009. 
However, the provisions are not applicable to trades in corporate bonds that are traded on 
the capital market or equity segment of the stock exchanges and are required to be settled 
through clearing houses of stock exchanges. 
 
7. On November 29, 2010 SEBI requested the Ministry of Labor to issue directions to 
authorities responsible for Provident Funds/Pension Funds/Pension Schemes to ensure 
mandatory reporting of corporate bond trades and to ensure clearing and settlement of 
such trades through NSCCL or ICCL. Subsequently the Pension Fund Regulatory and 
Development Authority (PFRDA) in a circular dated December 30, 2010 asked all 
Provident Funds to mandatorily report and settle the trades in corporate bonds with the 
Clearing Corporation. 
 
Through these measures, SEBI has tried to promote secondary market activity in the bond 
market. With the infrastructure that these measures have spawned, the Indian bond market 
potentially enjoys improved transparency and pre-requisites for greater activity such as an 
established clearing and settlement mechanism, a market-driven trading platform and smaller lot 
sizes for trading. For a variety of other reasons however, secondary market activity continues to 
be subdued. As recent as November 2013, SEBI underscored the need for a unified trading 
platform for corporate bonds in order to integrate the activities of the OTC platform, the 
exchanges and FIMMDA.  
 
 
Retail Debt Market 
The retail trading in G-Secs started on January 16, 2003 in accordance with the SEBI 
Circular dated January 10, 2003. Both NSE and BSE introduced trading facility through 
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which retail investors could buy and sell G-Secs. Table	  2 below shows the dismal picture 
of volume and number of trades in the retail debt market (RDM) at NSE. 
Table	  2:	  Business	  growth	  in	  NSE’s	  RDM	  segment	  
Period	   No.	  of	  Trades	   Traded	  Quantity	   Traded	  Value	  (INR	  Lakhs)	  
2003-­‐2004	   912	   372,820	   464	  
2004-­‐2005	   31	   122,390	   149	  
2005-­‐2006	   0	   0	   0	  
2006-­‐2007	   4	   121,20	   14	  
2007-­‐2008	   0	   0	   0	  
2008-­‐2009	   0	   0	   0	  
2009-­‐2010	   5	   50	   0	  
2010-­‐2011	   2	   20	   0	  
 
Wholesale Debt Market (WDM) 
NSE’s WDM segment provides trading facilities for a variety of debt instruments 
including Government Securities, Treasury Bills and Bonds issued by Public Sector 
Undertakings/ Corporates/ Banks like Floating Rate Bonds, Zero Coupon Bonds, 
Commercial Papers, Certificate of Deposits, Corporate Debentures, State Government 
loans, SLR and Non-SLR Bonds issued by Financial Institutions, Units of Mutual Funds 
and Securitized debt by banks, financial institutions, corporate bodies, trusts and others. 
The WDM segment showed robust growth during the period 1995-2004 at which point 
the G-Sec secondary market lost its steam due to rising interest rates after 2004 (Figure	  
10).  
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Figure	  10:	  Business	  growth	  in	  NSE	  WDM	  segment 
 The market regulator (in this case, SEBI) has systematically attempted to weed-
out secondary market issues and tried to promote more activity, in the process of 
attempting to enable the corporate bond secondary market and making them more 
efficient. However, data suggests that secondary market activity remains subdued. 
Though the necessary infrastructure is in place for a conducive and active secondary 
market, there is one more portion of the larger issue that regulators have tried to address 
time and again but without much success– the presence of an active hedging market or 
the availability of adequate risk-management tools. The hedging market is fairly new and 
has witnessed very low levels of activity owing to it being highly complex and regulated.  
 
 
 RISK AND HEDGING RELATED ISSUES: CDS 
One of the standard instruments used to hedge against risk in a corporate debt market is 
the credit default swap or CDS instrument. A CDS is a credit derivative contract between 
two counterparties. The buyer makes periodic payments to the seller, and in return 
receives a payoff if an underlying financial instrument defaults or experiences a similar 
credit event. Development of a CDS market may lead to a gradual deepening of the 
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corporate bond market as CDSs can enhance the bond market investors’ appetite for 
lower rated issuers, beyond their traditional favorites in the high-safety category.  
CDS market in India 
India’s fledgling CDS market kicked-off on Dec 6, 2011 with two deals covering 100 
million rupees ($1.9 million) worth of bonds. The deals, both 1-year trades were between 
ICICI Bank and IDBI Bank (underwriter), at 90 basis points and covered 50 million 
rupees each of 10-year bonds issued by Rural Electrification Corp (REC) and India 
Railway Finance Corp, according to details on the Clearing Corp of India Ltd’s website. 
The RBI has since then allowed banks to begin hedging their banking and trading books 
using CDS, signalling that the infrastructure is finally in place for the launch of the 
instruments in Asia’s fourth biggest bond market. 
According to paragraph 113 of the Second Quarter Review of Monetary Policy for 
year 2009-10, an Internal Group was constituted by the RBI to finalize the operational 
framework for the introduction of plain vanilla OTC single-name CDS for corporate 
bonds in India. Draft guidelines on CDS based on the recommendations of the Group 
were placed on the RBI website on February 23, 2011 and were open for comments from 
all concerned. Comments were received from a wide spectrum of banks, primary dealers 
and other market participants and accordingly the guidelines were suitably revised in the 
light of the feedback received. The guidelines became effective from October 24, 2011. 
The RBI guidelines which incorporate learning from the CDS markets worldwide 
ensure that CDS is neither used for speculative purposes nor to build up excessive 
leveraged exposures. Following stipulations are directed particularly at avoiding any 
serious systemic threat that maybe caused by such an innovative and complex financial 
product: 
• Only investors who own the underlying securities are allowed to purchase 
CDS insurance thereby ruling out the entire gamut of ‘naked’ CDS contracts 
and ensuring that the CDS market cannot get bigger than the underlying debt 
market. The investors are required to submit an auditor’s certificate or 
custodian’s certificate to the protection sellers, of having the underlying bond 
while entering into/unwinding the CDS contract. This is good for ensuring 
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liquidity in the bond market without inviting systemic risk related troubles by 
curbing speculation but bad for the CDS market development per se. 
• Trading in the derivative contracts will remain confined to lenders based in 
India thereby limiting the number of participants and making it easier to 
regulate and monitor. At the moment only banks can sell protection whereas 
in markets like the US, the sellers would include hedge funds, insurance 
companies, and asset managers. In India, only Banks, primary dealers, 
financially strong non-bank finance companies and any institution approved 
by the RBI will be eligible as market makers and will be allowed to sell 
protection. Foreign participants and hedge funds, which typically have a big 
appetite for credit risk, are not allowed to sell protection. Foreign institutional 
investors are allowed as “users”, which means that they can buy credit 
protection to only hedge their credit risk. Although RBI’s guidelines allow 
insurance companies and mutual funds to be sellers, this is subject to their 
respective regulators (IRDA and SEBI) permitting them to do so. This is not 
likely to happen until the market has become a bit more developed. 
• Entities permitted to quote both buy and/or sell CDS spreads — market 
makers — need a minimum capital to risk (weighted) assets ratio (CRAR) of 
11 percent and Net NPAs of less than 3 per cent. 
• Users or buyer of CDS contracts are not allowed to sell protection and are not 
permitted to hold net short positions in the CDS contracts. 
• Investors can exit their bought CDS positions by unwinding them with the 
original counterparty or by assigning them in favor of buyer of the underlying 
bond. The RBI has also included restructuring under credit events for CDS. 
Buyers will have a grace period of 10 business days from the sale of the 
underlying bond to unwind the CDS position. 
• CDS will be allowed only on listed corporate bonds as reference obligations. 
However, CDS can also be written on unlisted but rated bonds of 
infrastructure companies. 
• The CDS contract shall be denominated and settled in Indian Rupees. 
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• The RBI does not permit dealing in any structured financial product with CDS 
as one of the components neither will it allow dealing in any derivative 
product where the CDS itself is an underlying. 
• Fixed Income Money Market and Derivatives Association of India 
(FIMMDA) shall devise a Master Agreement for Indian CDS. There would be 
two sets of documentation: one set covering transactions between user and 
market-maker and the other set covering transactions between two market-
makers. 
• The CDS contracts shall be standardized. The standardization of CDS 
contracts shall be achieved in terms of coupon, coupon payment dates, etc. as 
put in place by FIMMDA in consultation with the market participants. This 
guards against customized contracts wherein the market-makers and users are 
free to determine the terms. 
• Protection seller in the CDS market shall have in place internal limits on the 
gross amount of protection sold by them on a single entity as well as the 
aggregate of such individual gross positions. These limits shall be set in 
relation to their capital funds. Protection sellers shall also periodically assess 
the likely stress that these gross positions of protection sold, may pose on their 
liquidity position and their ability to raise funds, at short notice. 
• Market makers shall report their CDS trades with both users/investors and 
other market-makers on the reporting platform of CDS trade repository within 
30 minutes from the deal time. The users would be required to affirm or reject 
their trade already reported by the market- maker by the end of the day. 
• For CDS transactions, the individual market participants would maintain the 
margins. Participants may maintain margins in cash or Government securities. 
The vast majority of the Indian corporate debt market consists of bonds from state 
banks and quasi government entities. The rest comprises mostly of debt from high 
investment-grade corporate borrowers where the motivation of the bondholder to buy 
CDS protection is low. The volume of medium to low investment-grade corporate bonds 
in India is insignificant but the availability of CDS protection may help it grow 
substantially. 
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Increased use of CDS, over the medium term, has the potential to impart 
additional liquidity to the bond markets, which have so far been predominantly illiquid. It 
will help lower rated borrowers diversify their funding sources by accessing the bond 
markets. CDS also holds promise of providing a thrust to the much-needed infrastructure 
financing. RBI has allowed dealing in CDS for infrastructure companies even on unlisted 
bonds, rather than only on the listed ones. A coordinated action by the other regulators 
can allow insurance companies, pension funds, and provident funds to also participate in 
this space through the CDS route. 
 
RISK AND HEDGING RELATED ISSUES: INTEREST RATE FUTURES 
A corporate debt market also suffers from an inherent interest rate risk-one of the most 
pervasive risks in an economy. The increasing importance of interest rate risk for the 
corporate sector in a deregulated interest rate environment is now widely appreciated. A 
way to hedge against such a risk is to use an interest rate future (henceforth IRF). 
Like the CDS, an IRF is a financial derivative based on an underlying security, a 
debt obligation that moves in value as interest rates change. Buying an interest rate 
futures contract will allow the buyer to lock in a future investment rate. When the interest 
rates scale up, the buyer will pay the seller of the futures contract an amount equal to the 
profit expected when investing at a higher rate against the rate mentioned in the futures 
contract. On the flip side when the interest rates go down, the seller will pay off the buyer 
for the poorer interest rate when the futures contract expires. In other words, IRFs are an 
agreement to buy or sell an underlying debt security at a fixed price on a fixed day in the 
future, and the prices of these derivatives mirror the rise and fall in the yield of the 
underlying government bonds. Unlike overnight interest rate swaps, IRFs have to be 
traded on exchanges rather than over the counter. 
IRFs account for the largest volume among financial derivatives traded on 
exchanges worldwide. For financial markets in India, IRFs present a much needed 
opportunity for hedging and risk management by a wide range of institutions and 
intermediaries, including banks, primary dealers, corporations, foreign institutional 
investors, retail investors etc. 
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2003 Initiative in India 
As a part of the process to make Indian financial market more robust, the finance ministry 
and regulators like Reserve Bank of India introduced some new financial products 
between 2000 and 2005. Introduction of IRFs in 2003, which allowed participants to take 
a call on the future movement of interest rates as a hedging tool, was one such move. 
The SEBI group on Secondary Market Risk Management first discussed the 
introduction of interest rate derivatives in India at its meeting on March 12, 2003 and 
then the NSE first launched 10-year bond futures in June 2003. According to the RBI, it 
was necessary to supplement the OTC market for interest rate products by an active 
exchange-traded derivative market. However the initiative turned out to be a failure; in 
less than three months after the launch, trading in bond futures literally stopped. Among 
other factors, restrictions on short selling and requiring financial institutions to use 
derivatives only for hedging purposes could account for the inactivity of the product. In 
other words, the absence of speculators may have robbed the market off badly needed 
liquidity. 
2009 Initiative 
As the market for IRFs failed to pick up and almost vanished, it was reintroduced in 
August 2009 to allow participants to buy protection against and bet on interest rates 
changes. Trading in interest rate futures on 91 day Treasury Bills began on August 31, 
2009, clocking trading volumes of Rs 276 crore on the first day of trade. The SEBI and 
the Reserve Bank of India have limited the maturity of IRF contracts between a minimum 
of three months and a maximum of 12 months. While the maximum tenor of the futures 
contract is 1 year or 12 months, usually it would have to be rolled over in three months 
making the contract cycle span over four fixed quarterly contracts. 
This time around banks were allowed to hedge interest rate risks as well as take bets 
on the rate trajectory. Also, foreign institutional investors were given access to the 
market. This apart, a company, or a non-resident Indian or a retail investor was also 
eligible to trade in the IRFs market. The following are some of the advantages of this 
initiative: 
	   26	  
• Interest rate futures on 91-day treasury bill can be used for hedging against 
volatile interest rates. 
• They are cash-settled, as a result, investors can trade without the worry of being 
saddled with illiquid contacts, which could have been the case if the contracts 
were physically settled. 
• No securities transaction tax (STT) is levied. 
• Low margins required as compared to trading in equities and equity derivatives. 
• The new product would be traded in the currency segment of the exchange 
so there is no requirement of any new formalities of a new account. 
However the 2009 initiative failed to click as well. The average daily trading turnover 
on NSE fell from Rs 77.5 crore in September 2009 to Rs 6 crore in January 2010. By 
February 2010, the average trading value dropped to a meager Rs 3.02 crore. Since then 
NSE began registering almost nil volumes for several months. Trading in IRFs has thus 
slowed to a trickle as initial enthusiasm has been replaced by worries about the limited 
variety of players in the market and fears that the dice are loaded in favor of sellers. 
According to bankers, one problem seems to be that the underlying bonds are illiquid. In 
a bid to ease concerns over delivery obligations, in December 2009, SEBI allowed 
exchanges to set any period of time during the delivery month as the delivery period for 
the securities. 
According to SBI officials, the product itself is defective because only the seller gains 
as he has the discretion of delivering either liquid or illiquid securities. Moreover, 
developed markets where IRFs have already taken off allow short selling and provide a 
good repo market. In India, short selling is not allowed beyond five days, and the repo 
market is not adequately developed. As a result there are mostly people who want to the 
sell the futures and buy bonds on spot thereby creating a situation wherein everyone sits 
on one side of the market. 
To alleviate some of these concerns, Life Insurance Corp. of India, India’s largest 
insurer, and RBI decided to purchase government bonds from members who desire to 
liquidate the securities received against their interest rate derivative obligations. Analysts 
have also pointed out that the three months’ tenor for the underlying asset (91- day Tbills 
in this case) is too short to base an IRF product on. IRFs seem to be on a deathbed due to 
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complete lack of interest among the participants. In fact, in some of the trading days the 
volume has been as low as Rs 9 lakh. Lack of awareness among the Indian financial 
institutions is another major reason while the foreign financial institutions find the Indian 
market too small and the size of the deals tiny. 
The second reason is the lack of depth because only two government securities have 
been introduced for future options while large number of other government bonds and 
corporate bonds are still out of the purview of interest rate futures. Moreover, according 
to market players, the prime reason for the failure of this segment is that banks are 
staying away from it. While the OTC market sees huge participation from foreign and 
private sector banks, the exchange platform has not been able to attract the same players. 
In order to revive this promising financial product and to make it robust, a long term 
planning is required. We need to create much more awareness on the efficacy of interest 
rate future as a hedging tool against interest rate volatility, and there should be many 
more securities. 
2011 Initiative 
In 2011, SEBI decided to introduce new products in the sagging IRF segment such as 
derivatives based on shorter-tenure bonds that can be cash-settled. On Dec 30, 2011, RBI 
and SEBI decided to introduce IRFs on notional 2-year and 5-year coupon bearing G-
Secs. The 2-year and 5-year IRF contracts shall be cash-settled and the final settlement 
price shall be based on the yields of the basket of securities underlying each Interest Rate 
Futures contract specified by the respective stock exchange. Shorter duration products 
that can be settled in cash are expected to attract market players. 
The industry has been asking for such products and the policymakers are hoping 
that it will provide new life to the IRF segment. However according to skeptics, the 
market has totally shunned these instruments and the current environment does not 
guarantee any success for the new products either. No one is willing to bet on rates on 
account of high inflation and high borrowing. 
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CONCLUSION 
Development of long-term debt markets is critical for the mobilization of the huge 
magnitude of funding required to finance potential businesses as well as infrastructure 
expansion. Despite a plethora of measures adopted by the authorities over the last few 
years, India has been distinctly lagging behind other developed as well as emerging 
economies in developing its long-term corporate debt market. Traditionally, bank 
finance, coupled with equity markets and external borrowings have been the preferred 
funding sources. The domestic corporate debt market suffers from deficiencies in 
products, participants and institutional framework. As India aims to regain its erstwhile 
high growth rates of the early 2000s, there is bound to be a lot of pressure on 
infrastructure financing which is currently done primarily through budgetary support or 
bank credit and this is where a well-developed corporate bond market can play a 
significant role.  
Some of the main challenges facing the corporate bond market as detailed in this 
chapter remain the inadequate liquidity in the secondary market, lack of debt market 
accessibility to small and medium enterprises, dearth of a well-functioning derivatives 
market that could have absorbed risks emanating from interest rate fluctuations and 
default possibilities, inadequate market infrastructure, excessive regulatory restrictions on 
the investment mandate of financial institutions, large fiscal deficit, high interest rates 
and the dominance of issuances through private placements and AAA rated bonds which 
in turn also prevent retail participation and aggravate the dependence on bank financing.  
According to a survey conducted by the Confederation of the India Industry (CII), 
the Indian corporate bond market is estimated to attain a size equal to 15% of GDP by the 
end of the 12th Plan i.e. by 2017. In order for this to be achieved there has to be concerted 
policy and regulatory reforms as well as adequate political will to bring about legislative 
and fiscal changes. Bold and sustainable reforms are urgently needed to develop the 
interest rate futures and credit default swap markets in order to give market participants a 
chance to hedge their risk, create a liquid and active secondary market thereby preventing 
investors from following their current buy and hold strategies, and of course, encourage 
wider investor participation.  
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For India to have a well-developed, vibrant, internationally comparable corporate 
debt market that is able to meet the growing financing requirements of the country’s 
dynamic private sector, there needs to be effective co-ordination and co-operation 
between the market participants that include investors as well as corporations issuing the 
bonds and the regulators. Self-regulation by market players may also be more effective 
than any enforced control. Issues such as crowding of debt markets by government 
securities cannot be addressed by market participants and regulators alone. Better 
management of public debt and cash could result in a reduction in the debt requirements 
of the government, which in turn would provide more market space and create greater 
demand for corporate debt securities. 
Clearly, the market development for corporate bonds in India is likely to be a 
gradual process as experienced in other countries. Regulators as well as market 
participants need to play a proactive role. It is important to understand whether the 
regulators have sufficient willingness to shift away from a loan-driven economy and also 
whether the corporations themselves have strong incentives to help develop a deep bond 
market. Only a conjunction of the two can pave the way for the systematic development 
of a well-functioning corporate bond market.  
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